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The article analyses factors constraining the capacity of the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA) to raise domestic tax revenue during the period 1994-2000. The article shows that 
more than any other factor, Israel represented a constraint on the PNA’s tax policies and 
revenue collection. Israel collected the bulk of taxes on traded goods on behalf of the PNA, 
and until 2000 a large share of income tax came from Palestinians working in Israel. By 
withholding revenue collected on behalf of the PNA, Israel was able to exert substantial 
financial pressure on the PNA. However, within its restricted room of manoeuvre, the PNA 
managed to raise significant domestic revenues subject to the constraint of consolidating and 
maintaining its power. The PNA also used the tax system as a means of enhancing rents from 
industries and sectors that the leadership believed were important for economic development, 
and to grant generous tax exemptions to politically important stakeholders.  
 
Keywords: Taxation, tax administration, economic policy, institutions, state formation, 
foreign aid, Israel, Palestine.    
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1. Introduction 
States need money. States under formation need a lot of money. But while the politics of 
revenue mobilisation is one of the most important policy concerns for any state, we know 
very little about it during processes of state formation. This is surprising given the fact that 
tax revenue is central to (i) building state capacity and service delivery; (ii) the shaping of 
state-society relations; and (iii) the sustainability of aid interventions (Levi, 1988; Steinmo, 
1993; Moore, 1998). Furthermore, based on historical evidence from the West, the way a state 
tackles the issue of domestic revenue mobilisation significantly influences its potential for 
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economic growth and democratic consolidation (Tilly, 1992). Hence, a key question is: What 
are the main factors constraining a regime’s capacity to raise revenue during state formation?  
 
The Palestinian experiences over the period 1994-2000 provide an opportunity to explore this 
question. Although the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) operated over only a small part 
of the territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS), it had a degree of sovereign 
legitimacy within the Palestinian territories in this period. The PNA set up institutions that 
were intended gradually to form the core of a future Palestinian state (Hilal and Khan, 2004). 
It established state institutions such as ministries and agencies, and a tax system was 
developed. Based on the institutional literature, we suggest that the PNA faced four main 
constraints to enhancing domestic revenue. These constraints emanated from: (i) the 
effectiveness of the tax administration; (ii) the nature and capacity of the political institutions; 
(iii) the PNA’s bargaining position vis-à-vis various groups of citizens, including owners of 
capital; and (iv) the impacts of foreign aid on domestic revenue generation.  
 
The article shows that more than any other factor, Israel represented a constraint on the 
PNA’s tax policies and revenue collection. Israel collected the bulk of taxes on traded goods 
on behalf of the PNA, and until 2000 a large share of income taxes came from Palestinians 
working in Israel. By withholding revenue collected on behalf of the PNA, Israel was able to 
exert substantial financial pressure on the PNA. However, the article argues, within its 
restricted room of manoeuvre, the PNA managed to raise significant domestic revenues 
subject to the constraint of consolidating and maintaining its power. It also used the tax 
system as a means of enhancing rents from industries and sectors that the leadership believed 
were important for economic development, and to grant generous tax exemptions to 
politically important stakeholders such as professionals.  
 
The Palestinian state-formation process is now at a standstill. Officially, the process started 
with the signing of the first Oslo Agreement in Washington on 13 September 1993, followed 
by the famous handshake between the PLO leader Yassar Arafat, the late Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.1 It ended – at least for the 
                            
1 The Oslo Agreement was a declaration of principles which laid the foundation for limited, interim Palestinian 
self-rule in those areas of Palestine occupied by Israel since 1967: the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and 
the Gaza Strip (WBGS). This included approximately 20 per cent of the Palestine that the United Nations 
decided to separate into two states in 1947. Actually, there were two Israeli-Palestinian agreements, referred to 
as Oslo I (signed in September 1993) and Oslo II (signed in September 1995). See Butenschøn (1998) for an 
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foreseeable future - with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, which 
ignited in late September 2000 a popular uprising known as the al-Aqsa intifada in the 
occupied territories and inside Israel.2 But, although the events since autumn 2000 have put 
further progress on hold, the experiences over the period 1994-2000 may provide important 
lessons about the economic, political and institutional constraints that a future Palestinian 
state will face with respect to revenue mobilisation.  
 
The remaining part of the article is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the 
macroeconomic policy and the tax system in Palestine over the period 1994-2000. In Section 
3 various institutional approaches to analysing the constraints facing a state’s revenue policies 
are discussed. Section 4 analyses factors constraining the PNAs’ capacity to raise revenue. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Macroeconomic policy and the tax system in Palestine  
In the period 1994-2000 the PNA was a self-government that possessed administrative, 
legislative and political power over only parts of its territory. About a third of the area of the 
Gaza Strip (GS) and around 60 per cent of the West Bank (WB) were controlled by Israel. 
However, the majority of the population of more than 3 million people came under the 
jurisdiction of the PNA, except those living in East Jerusalem and some villages in the West 
Bank that were under Israeli security control. With a GDP per capita income of US$ 1387 (in 
1998), Palestine fell into the category of middle-income countries (PCBS, 1999).3 The official 
unemployment rate was 14.1 per cent in 2000 (DSP, 2002). But when workers discouraged 
from entering or remaining in the labour force are included the unemployment rate is 
estimated to be almost 40 per cent in the last quarter of 2000.  
 
                                                                                     
analysis of the Oslo Agreements placed in the context of Israeli and Palestinian political strategies. Giacaman 
and Lønning (1998) provide a critical assessment of the Oslo process from various perspectives. 
2 The al-Aqsa Mosque, located at the Temple Mount, was built by the Caliph al-Walid (r. 705-715) of the 
Umayyad dynasty. It is one of the three most revered places of worship for Muslims, and a major religious and 
educational centre. Moreover, it is a showcase for Islamic architecture and design from Umayyad to Ottoman 
times. 
3 This average excludes East Jerusalem, with a population of more than 210,000 (in 1997). The figure also hides 
substantial differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Since the second intifada started in 
September 2000, living conditions in WBGS have deteriorated dramatically. Real GDP per capita has now 
reached its lowest level since 1980. By the end of the year 2000, 35 per cent of the population lived below the 
poverty line, a figure that rose to over 50 per cent by the end of 2001 (see UNSCO, 2001: 29). 
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The PNA implemented and maintained a liberal economic policy regime, emphasising 
incentives for investments and a stable macroeconomic environment. Following the Oslo 
Accord between the PLO and Israel, the PNA’s principal challenges were to promote 
economic development and alleviate poverty. But the PNA faced major constraints in 
pursuing these objectives: lack of control over borders, limited control over land, water and 
other natural resources, poor physical infrastructure, weak institutions, limited financial and 
human capital, and a high degree of political and economic uncertainty. In this setting, the 
PNA chose an investor-friendly policy with the aim of furthering economic growth. This 
policy was also encouraged by the international community and foreign donors. In particular, 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were influential in pushing for an 
export-oriented, private-sector-led market economy (PNA, 1996). 
 
The private sector was dominated by small, family-owned farms and enterprises and peasant 
agriculture. Many of the larger private firms, including some monopolies, were owned or 
managed by high-ranking public officials (PLC, 1997; CPRS, 1998). Some of the larger 
companies were fully or partially owned by the PNA. These included, for instance, the 
Petroleum Public Commission, the Tobacco Commission, the Radio and Television 
Commission, and the Palestinian National Company for Economic Development (Nasr, 
2004). Private-sector job creation, however, was disappointing despite the growth-oriented 
policies adopted during the period 1994-2000. As a result the tax base did not expand 
significantly. 
 
At the same time, the public sector expanded rapidly. Total public expenditures accounted for 
more than 27 per cent of GDP in 1999, compared to 14.7 per cent when the PNA was 
established (Fischer et al., 2001: 256). This expansion was mainly due to an almost fourfold 
increase in public sector employees, including security forces (from 31,140 in 1994 to 
approximately 110,000 in mid-2000), and an expansion of social services in health and 
education. This reflects that the PNA used public office holding as a reward for political and 
personal loyalty, and as a mechanism of incorporation and stabilisation of the regime (Hilal 
and Khan, 2004). The growth in public sector employment had to slow down by the end of 
the 1990s, partly because of financial constraints, but also due to increasing criticisms of 
inefficient, overstaffed government departments. Nevertheless, by end-1999, about 19 per 
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cent of all employed persons in the WBGS were on the PNA’s payroll (including education, 
health and security forces).4  
 
 
Fiscal policy and revenue clearance with Israel 
The ratio of Palestinian fiscal revenue to GDP was estimated at 23.4 per cent in 1999, which 
compares well with countries at a similar level of development (Fischer et al., 2001: 272).5 
Table 1 provides an overview of the composition of fiscal revenue in Palestine during the 
period 1995-1999. The major tax bases were personal and corporate income taxes (8.2 per 
cent of total tax revenue in 1999), indirect taxes on domestic goods and services (47.7 per 
cent) and taxes on international transactions (30.3 per cent). Furthermore, various types of 
fees and charges were collected. While Value Added Tax (VAT) and other indirect taxes on 
domestic goods and services still accounted for almost half of the total tax revenue, their share 
dropped substantially during the late 1990s. In 1995, they accounted for about 66 per cent of 
total revenue. During the same period, revenue from customs duties and taxes on imported 
goods increased from about 6 per cent of total revenue in 1995 to approximately 30 per cent 
in 1999. Income tax revenue remained fairly stable at around 8-9 per cent of total fiscal 
revenue during the period 1996-99.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 IN ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
 
 
                            
4 According to Nasr (2004), the public sector wage bill amounted to more than 12 per cent of GDP in 1999.  
5 The figure is, however, higher than the average for Arab countries. In 1995, tax revenue as a percentage of 
GNP for Egypt was 26.3 per cent, for Yemen 13 per cent, Morocco 23 per cent, Syria 17.8 per cent, Jordan 20.4 
per cent, Tunisia 21 per cent, and Lebanon 10.8 per cent. All these countries had lower GDP figures than the 
PNA due to their dependence on migrant remittances (World Bank, 1997: 258-59).  
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The PNA’s fiscal operations in the period 1994-2000 were to a large extent governed by the 
principles of the Paris Protocol (PP), signed in 1994. This Protocol of Economic Relations 
between the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO, Representing the Palestinian 
People limited the role of the PNA in designing its own fiscal and trade regimes.6 In the area 
of tax administration, the PP provided a revenue clearance system, according to which Israel 
collected and transferred to the PNA taxes and customs duties imposed on Palestinian imports 
from or via Israel, in addition to the income taxes from wages of Palestinians working in 
Israel.  
 
The share of fiscal revenue collected by Israel through the clearing system remained fairly 
stable in the period 1995-99, and accounted for around 63 per cent of the PNA’s fiscal 
revenue in 1999 (Fischer et al., 2001: 267). However, for individual revenue bases some 
changes were observed during this period. For instance, in 1995 Israel collected 80.2 per cent 
of indirect taxes on domestic goods and services, compared to 70.8 per cent in 1999. The 
opposite trend was observed for indirect taxes on international transactions where Israel 
collected 72.1 per cent in 1995, compared to 87.9 per cent in 1999 (Table 2).7  
 
These figures demonstrate the heavy dependence – and vulnerability – of the Palestinian 
economy on Israel with respect to revenue from foreign trade, employment and tax. However, 
they also indicate that during the first years of operation, the unified invoice system seemed to 
function fairly well, and probably better than most other arrangements between the PNA and 
Israel. But it is clear that Israel’s narrow interpretation of the clause of ‘place of final 
destination’ of imports led to substantial revenue losses (see Section 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
                            
6 The full title of the Paris Protocol indicates that it was drawn up between two equal partners, in spite of the fact 
that one contract partner was a state and the other an organisation (see Arnon and Weinblatt, 2001: 295). 
Kanafani (2001) provides an insightful discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the PP from both Israeli 
and Palestinian perspectives.  
7 These figures include income taxes, indirect taxes on domestic goods and services (VAT and excises), taxes on 
international transactions, and non-tax revenue. However, property taxes and local government taxes and charges 
are excluded. 
 7
TABLE 2 IN ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
 
3. Institutional perspectives on constraints to revenue mobilisation 
What factors explain the evolution of the Palestinian tax system over the period 1994-2000? 
Based on the institutional literature derived from Western historical experiences we suggest 
that the PNA faced four main constraints to enhancing domestic revenue.8 
  
First, there is increasing evidence that the effectiveness of the tax system depends on the 
efficiency and integrity of the tax administration (Bird, 1992; Das-Gupta and Mookherjee, 
1998). In many developing countries the low-revenue yield of taxation is attributed to the fact 
that the tax provisions are not properly enforced, either due to poor administrative capacity or 
due to corruption (Chand and Moene, 1999; Fjeldstad and Tungodden, 2003). No system of 
tax laws, however carefully conceived, is proof against collusion between the tax collectors 
and the taxpayers. Hence, an efficient tax administration consisting of competent people of 
high integrity is an important requirement for enhancing revenue and fully exploiting the tax 
potential of the country. It is reasonable to assume that this also applies to Palestine.  
 
Second, political institutions matter (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Levi, 1988; Steinmo, 
1993). According to Steinmo (1993), differences in tax systems and tax burdens between 
countries are due to differences in the way political institutions function, and involve factors 
such as the relations and degree of power-sharing between the executive and the parliament. 
Hence, in the Palestinian context we would expect the tax system to reflect to some extent the 
relative bargaining power of the executive vis-à-vis other domestic political institutions. It is 
also reasonable to assume that political and administrative agreements with other states affect 
domestic policy-making in the area of taxation. Political institutional constraints on taxation 
must therefore be understood in the context of the broader national and international 
                            
8 In a study of the development of the Namibian tax system, Rakner (2001) applies a similar analytical 
framework. Therkildsen (2001) provides a critical review of this literature and its relevance for developing 
countries. 
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economic and political setting in which they are embedded. In Palestine we would expect the 
institutions governing the fiscal relations between Israel and the PNA to be important.  
 
Thirdly, the bargaining power of various individuals and interest groups are likely to matter. 
Following the approach suggested by Levi (1988), rulers maximise revenue to the state but 
not as they please, due to the various constraints: transaction costs in tax enforcement, their 
own time preference, and their relative bargaining power vis-à-vis agents and constituents 
(ibid, p. 10). These constraints, she argues, determine the choice of revenue system, since 
rulers do not possess unlimited power, nor do constituents pay taxes voluntarily. But, even 
with extensive power and effective monitoring of taxpayers, a ruler cannot achieve full 
compliance. Consequently, a ruler attempts to improve compliance at minimum costs, while 
taxpayers try to avoid and evade taxes (Levi, 1988: 49). A ‘balance’ between these conflicting 
interests is achieved through bargaining between the ruler and various groups making up the 
polity. However, once negotiated, the contract between the rulers and constituents comes 
under pressure due to free-rider problems, imperfections in the specification of the contract, 
and changes in the relative bargaining power between rulers and constituencies. The mutual 
advantages of co-operation between rulers and citizens are greatest where capital is mobile, 
particularly in the form of financial and trading assets. Co-operation protects owners of 
capital from arbitrary and exploitative tax enforcement. Rulers on the other hand can gain 
greater tax compliance from co-operation by retaining owners of mobile capital within their 
jurisdiction and by attracting capitalists from other states. Hence, in the Palestinian context 
we would expect that various interest groups may negotiate favourable deals for themselves, 
or that people may find ways to evade taxes. In particular, we would expect to see that 
differences in the bargaining power of individual businesses, for instance related to their size 
and strategic importance for the PNA, are reflected in the tax system.  
 
Fourth, the domestic tax system may be affected by the international system of financial 
transfers, in particular foreign aid. Some scholars argue that high levels of aid diminish a 
government’s incentive to make full use of its domestic resources for revenue generation 
(Brautigam and Botchwey, 1999). Furthermore, according to Moore (1998) bargaining over 
the budget and over tax policy is one of the primary ways in which different state and societal 
goals are reconciled in a democracy. He argues that the more a state ‘earns’ its tax revenue 
from its domestic population through the operation of a bureaucratic apparatus for tax 
collection, the more it needs to enter into reciprocal arrangements with citizens about 
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provision of services and political representation.9 But such processes are not likely to operate 
when the state is fiscally independent of its population because much of its revenue is 
‘unearned’ – for instance, obtained from foreign aid (or natural resources such as oil and 
minerals). Hence, in the Palestinian context, a relevant question is whether foreign aid, so 
substantial in relation to other income sources, has provided a disincentive for domestic 
revenue mobilisation?  
 
4. Constraints on tax policy in Palestine 
In this section we explore the impacts of the four sets of constraining factors outlined above 
on the PNA’s efforts to raise domestic revenue.  
 
Tax administration 
In the areas controlled by the PNA, there were four central government agencies authorised to 
collect taxes: (i) the Customs Department collected customs duties on goods imported directly 
from Jordan and Egypt or through these countries; (ii) the VAT and Excise Taxes Department 
collected VAT and purchase tax on domestic goods and services; (iii) the Income Tax 
Department collected personal income taxes through a withholding system, as well as 
corporate profit taxes from registered companies based on self-assessment; and (iv) the Fiscal 
Department collected and managed the property taxes. There were 12 offices for each of these 
departments in the main towns in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Health, insurance, 
transportation and other charges were collected through different offices on an annual basis. 
With respect to local government taxes, the taxing power of local authorities was limited. 
Various forms of user charge were major revenue sources for local authorities during this 
period. Generally, the uncertain political situation and the PNA’s well-founded fear of 
increased fractionalisation of the country contributed to sustaining the centralised taxing 
agencies and restraining fiscal decentralisation.   
 
In the period 1995-2000, there were few and minor changes in the tax structure consisting of 
simplifications of the rate structures and reduction of some rates. The most important changes 
were related to the granting of tax exemptions. The limited number of changes is not 
surprising since the Paris Protocol placed substantial restrictions on how and what revisions 
                            
9 The concept ‘earned’ is a logical extension of the term ‘rentier’, since the latter means ‘unearned’ in the 
language of classical political economy (Moore, 1998: 94). 
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could be made. Thus, due to the compelling need to raise revenue quickly, the PNA focused 
on improving tax administration, including the revenue clearance system with Israel, rather 
than revising the existing tax structure. The increased domestic revenue generation during the 
period was, therefore, mainly due to administrative measures such as the implementation of a 
tax arrears settlement programme, improvements in enforcement provisions in the legislation 
and a campaign for tax registration. Additional measures to improve the tax administration, 
including the creation of a large taxpayer unit, a delinquent taxpayer unit and a tax court.10 
These measures enabled the PNA to establish potentially well-functioning central government 
tax agencies within a fairly short period of time. 
 
Despite the progress made to improve the tax administration there were substantial 
weaknesses. Firstly, the tax base was eroded due to generous tax exemptions. In particular 
larger companies, foreign investors, professionals and the agricultural sector benefited from 
exemptions. Secondly, some procedures facilitated tax evasion and corruption. These 
included:11 
 
• the absence of consistent audit and enforcement procedures and techniques;    
• a practice of ‘negotiating’ income tax assessments;  
• insufficient resources allocated to the large taxpayers unit; and   
• inadequate training of staff. 
 
The administrative structure that was established, with several forms of tax administration, 
put severe burdens on senior officials within the Ministry of Finance. For instance, they had 
to intervene to settle disputes on tax assessment especially when influential taxpayers were 
involved: ‘Give a discount or a tax exemption’ was the approach often used to solve 
problems. The integrity of the tax officers was under heavy pressure due to social obligations 
and political interventions, which reduced the arm’s length relations between taxpayers and 
enforcers. According to the Director of the Income Tax Department (ITD) of the West Bank, 
there were only 10 employees in this department in 2000. On average, each of these income 
                            
10 No tax disputes seem to have been solved by bringing them to court. Disputes have been solved either by 
forwarding them to the Chairman of the PNA (President Arafat), or by negotiations and compromises between 
the taxpayers and tax officials. 
11 Personal interview with an international public finance expert who was stationed for a period at the Ministry 
of Finance in Ramallah (Adel Zagha, January 2001). The person interviewed preferred to remain anonymous. 
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tax officers handled some 65 files in the West Bank.12 Tax assessments by the Palestinian 
Revenue Authority (PRA) found that in 90-95 per cent of the cases incomes were 
underreported. But, despite the existence of a tax court only two or three cases were filed to 
the court each year. Most of the cases found a compromise through negotiations between the 
taxpayer or his/her representative and the income tax official.  
 
Low wages in the public sector in general, and in the tax administration in particular, left no 
option but to accept the employment of less qualified graduates with limited skills in 
accounting. The best graduates were usually recruited to more attractive jobs in private 
accounting companies. Some of those who were recruited to the tax administration exploited 
their positions to supplement their own meagre salaries by extracting rents through the 
informal system of settling accounts. For instance, in a survey of small and medium-sized 
firms, 41 per cent of the respondents in the West Bank said that their own tax assessment 
differed from that of the revenue authority (PRA).13 Businesspeople interviewed gave various 
reasons to explain the differences in tax assessment, including ‘the PRA officials do not trust 
the books’, and ‘some expenses are not recognised by the tax officers’. As many as 35 per 
cent of the respondents in the WB said the differences were solved through negotiations with  
tax officers. Dishonest tax collectors were perceived to be a problem by 38 per cent of the 
respondents in the WB and by 30 per cent in Gaza.14 According to an official interviewed in 
the ITD in Ramallah, very few corrupt tax collectors were detected.15 However, the few who 
were caught were asked to resign to maintain their dignity instead of being brought to court. 
 
 
Political institutions 
The institutional constraints on policy changes were substantial in Palestine after Oslo. Many 
of the PNA’s fiscal operations were governed by the Paris Protocol, which only gave the PNA 
                            
12 Only 650 private companies were registered and had files at the ITD in 2000. In addition, there were some 30 
partnerships registered with files in the department. Public companies did not register. Registration was with the 
Ministry of Economy and Trade, which provided a license number accompanied by relevant information about 
the internal by-laws and a contract of establishment. Procedures for tax assessment were based on officially 
audited statements according to the companies and the tax code. On request, the Director of the ITD was not able 
to provide corresponding data from Gaza (Adel Zagha, January 2001). 
13 The survey was carried out in 2001 as part of this study.  
14 Some respondents mentioned that certain tax collectors gave them a ‘secret account number’ where deposits 
could be made to settle a tax assessment differential. Others said that they had to pay in the form of a gift 
(usually electrical devices).  
15 Personal interview (Adel al-Zagha, January 2001). 
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a limited role in designing its own fiscal and trade regimes (see Section 2). The Israeli 
interpretation of the terms of the Protocol also resulted in the loss of significant revenue for 
the PNA (Kanafani, 2000: 285-88). Israel collected a major share of the PNA’s tax revenue 
through the revenue clearance system (Table 3). But, the PNA could only reclaim import 
duties on goods that were directly imported by Palestinian companies via Israel. Products 
initially imported by Israeli companies, and then re-exported to the Palestinian territories, 
were, according to the Israeli interpretation of the Paris Protocol, not ‘proper imports’ and, 
thus, not eligible for re-claiming of customs duty. Since the bulk of the imports to Palestine 
came via Israeli companies, this arrangement led to substantial losses in customs revenue for 
the PNA. Furthermore, many Palestinian merchants disguised the true final destination of 
their imported goods in order to avoid delays and complications by the Israeli customs, with 
the consequence that the PNA lost revenue from import duties. Another significant source of 
fiscal leakage was Israel’s refusal to refund to the PNA the purchase tax, excise tax and 
surcharges that were imposed on some locally produced Israeli products exported to the 
WBGS and purchased by Palestinians. This reflects the imperfection of the bilateral contract 
as well as the asymmetry of power between Israel and the Palestinian authorities. 
 
There have been several attempts to estimate the extent of this lost revenue. According to 
Sahban and Jawhary (1995: xxxiii), the revenue lost on imports coming through Israel 
corresponded to about 6-7 per cent of GDP. The PNA estimated the ‘fiscal leakage’ at US$ 
380 million annually (PNA, 1998).16 Dumas (1999), however, concluded that the lost revenue 
amounted to US$ 90-140 million in 1997, equivalent to between 2.6 per cent and 4.2 per cent 
of the GDP of the WBGS. According to estimates made by the IMF resident mission in the 
WBGS, the annual loss in revenue through these unequal arrangements corresponded to 77 
per cent of the amount actually refunded in 1997.  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 IN ABOUT HERE 
 
                            
16 In comparison, total donor funding to the WBGS in 1998 was US$ 553 million (Table 3). 
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It is clear that the way certain aspects of the Paris Protocol were designed and implemented 
led to continuous conflicts of interest between the contracting parties. It also raises the 
question of why Palestinian negotiators initially accepted such terms. It seems, however, clear 
that the Palestinian negotiators tried to acquire as many attributes of sovereignty as possible, 
while the Israelis wanted to postpone as many decisions as possible in the negotiations over 
the final status of the Palestinian territories (Arnon and Weinblatt, 2001: 296). The 
Palestinians aspired to set their own priorities without Israeli interference, including the 
formation of a new Palestinian trade policy. The Israeli negotiators, however, wanted to 
continue the existing de facto (partial) customs union, which did not require the creation of 
trade borders between the two economies. They succeeded in convincing the Palestinians that 
a more protectionist policy would reduce the Palestinians’ chances of building a prosperous 
economy.  
 
The dependency on Israel through the revenue clearance system left the PNA extremely 
vulnerable and gave Israel a political weapon to exert pressure on the PNA. On several 
occasions during the 1997-2000 period Israel withheld tax revenue collected, in prima facie 
violation of the Paris Protocol (Nasr, 2004). This also reflects the imperfection of the bilateral 
contract whereby one side could violate the agreement without bearing noteworthy 
consequences (Arnon and Weinblatt, 2001: 302). To reduce its vulnerability the PNA 
undertook various types of off-budget (and, by definition, unregulated) fiscal activities and 
established ‘secret’ accounts. Little information exists on the sources and scope of these off-
budget accounts, or how these funds were used.17 Nevertheless, there have been repeated 
accusations of non-transparency and manipulation of the secret accounts controlled by the 
PNA. But, given the unstable political situation and the fact that Israel on several occasions 
stopped transferring tax revenue to the PNA, it seems both legitimate and rational that the 
                            
17 According to Fischer et al. (2001: 258), a large part of this money went to finance investments in commercial 
operations through the Palestinian Commercial Services Company (PCSC). But it is still not known how much 
has been used on current expenditures. 
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PNA operated by means of such accounts as a buffer against Israeli practice and in order to 
meet urgent needs and commitments.  
 
Hence, factors beyond the control of the PNA had a significant impact on both tax policy 
formulation and implementation. Thus, with respect to tax policy, the best the PNA could do 
was to strengthen the domestic tax administration. In addition to enhancing revenue, this 
measure had a specific political dimension. A tax system is potentially an instrument for 
political control, based on information about citizens, and a network of tax collectors. With 
little bureaucratic presence and limited information about what goes on at the grassroot level, 
a government can be vulnerable to organised predators, such as private armies and religious 
fundamentalists. These factors may contribute to explaining why the PNA put so much effort 
into establishing the new forms of tax administration (see above). It may also explain why 
several tax-collecting institutions were set up: namely, to obviate the risk of failure on the part 
of one central revenue authority. But it is also likely that establishing a centralised system of 
revenue administration would have required more financial and administrative resources than 
setting up several smaller ones. Furthermore, the establishment of the tax administration 
system in the WBGS was heavily influenced by the IMF and the World Bank. IMF missions 
in the mid- and late 1990s resided with the Ministry of Finance, which offered technical 
assistance and policy advice on taxation and administration. The International Finance 
Institutions focused particularly on building institutional capacity within the PNA, 
emphasising ‘transparency’ in government operations.18   
 
 
Civil society, interest groups and capital owners 
Within pluralist systems of rule, voluntary associations operating independently of state 
structures can be expected to play a major role in shaping and implementing tax policies. 
Thus, we would anticipate that the introduction of competitive electoral policies in Palestine 
would bring new stakeholders into the debates over the politics of taxation. The experiences 
with the PNA during the period 1994-2000 do not support this expectation. The 1996 election 
campaign produced a variety of political programmes by the different political organisations 
involved. But neither Fateh nor the opposition made any reference to taxation. Hence, it 
                            
18 In April 2000, however, the PNA consolidated all tax revenue under the Ministry of Finance. According to 
Fischer et al. (2001:271), the PNA took this step to ‘…make its own financial operations more transparent…’.  
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cannot be argued that the PNA faced any major challenges from its political opponents with 
respect to revenue policies. 
 
The general election in 1996, which was largely conducted in a free and democratic way, gave 
the emerging state system the legitimacy it required (Hilal and Khan, 2004). However, the 
executive controlled the security apparatus. In addition, most members of the ‘Palestinian 
leadership’ (the Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, heads of the main security 
forces, ministers, executive committee members, among others) owed their position to Arafat 
personally (Amundsen and Ezbidi, 2004). Furthermore, the political ‘leadership’ had no 
representatives from the private business community, the opposition or civil organisations. 
These features led to a situation where the PNA managed to centralise power.  
 
The increasing influence of the executive power in Palestine during the period 1994-2000 is 
partly explained by the weakness of various interest groups. Opposition parties more or less 
accepted to work within the constraints of the new regime (Hilal and Khan, 2004). Other civil 
society formations, such as professional associations and trade unions, lost much of their 
social base and mobilising capabilities in the early 1990s after the erosion of the popular 
character of the first intifada. The PLO factions created the main body of these civil society 
formations, with the overarching aim of organising opposition to the Israeli occupation and of 
providing services to poorer segments of the population. Hence, they posed no serious 
challenge to the regime.19  
 
A number of civic associations transformed themselves into professional NGOs – in the form 
of human rights advocacy, ‘developmental’ and service-oriented organisations. But the 
NGOs’ autonomy remained questionable, partly because of their dependency on short-term 
external donor funding, and partly because they had no real organised power base and 
therefore little real bargaining power with the ‘government’. They had therefore very limited 
influence on economic policies. According to Hilal and Khan (2004), most NGOs retained an 
interest in colluding with the PNA, as it was in their interest not to ‘irritate’ it. One outcome 
of this ‘collusion’ was that NGOs were exempted from taxation, including VAT and taxes on 
imported goods and services.  
                            
19 In 2000, several business associations joined forces with the aim of voicing their interests. In December 2000, 
an overarching co-ordinating body was established. This body included the main sectors of the indigenous 
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Few of the economic interest groups in Palestine had the capacity, in respect of membership 
density, finances and organisational resources, to engage in an active dialogue with the 
regime on issues of taxation and, more generally, economic development. Fateh dominated 
most of the professional associations, including those of lawyers, doctors and engineers (Hilal 
and Khan, 2004). These associations were better organised than popular organisations, and 
had, unlike NGOs, a well-defined and stable constituency. Hence, the relationship between 
professionals and Fateh allowed for some important channels of rent-seeking and political 
influence. For instance, many professionals stayed outside the tax net. The Income Tax 
Department (ITD) was tolerant towards them on the grounds that ‘it was enough that they 
paid the VAT’.20 This was so, even though the tax authorities assumed that many 
professionals underreported their income to evade taxes, and it was very difficult to check 
their true turnover. Thus, the lion’s share of personal income tax revenue was generated from 
wage employees where taxes were withheld at source.21  
 
From 1994 onwards, the PNA implemented an economic policy that benefited large corporate 
interests and the manufacturing industry, which had close linkages with the political and 
administrative elite or was owned by foreign investors. ‘Investor-friendly taxes’ were 
established; this meant relatively low corporate taxes and the absence of capital-gains taxes. 
The Investment Promotion Law, passed in 1995 and modified in 1998, aimed to provide 
incentives to local and foreign private entrepreneurs (Ministry of Economy and Trade, 1998: 
18-19).22 In 1997 and 1998, 144 projects applied for tax exemptions (74 in 1997 and 70 in 
1998).23 The Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency (PIPA) approved 125 projects. Of 
these only 52 were implemented in 1997 and 1998, representing a total investment of US$ 
97.5 million (i.e. 28.4 per cent of the projected investment). The remaining projects either 
                                                                                     
capital, including the Federation of Chambers and Commerce, the Federation of Chambers of Industry, Paltrade, 
and Palestine Information Technology Association. 
20 Personal communications with staff at the ITD (Adel al-Zagha, June 2001, Ramallah).  
21 To illustrate this point further, there were only 650 files on registered companies in the West Bank, and no 
company was registered in the Gaza Strip. This implies that on average a company in the West Bank paid less 
than US$ 18,000 in corporate taxes on an annual basis. This supports the argument that the Palestinian income 
tax during the period 1994-2000 was mainly imposed on individual wage earners and, to some extent, on smaller 
firms with limited opportunities for evasion of tax. 
22 The General Department of Investment at the Ministry of Economy and Trade provided internal reports (in 
Arabic) on investment projects that benefited from the law. The information in this paragraph is based on the 
reports for 1997 (before the law was passed by the PLC) and 1998.  
23 These projects represented total investments of US$ 343 million. Fully domestically-owned projects 
represented about 57 per cent of this capital, while exclusively foreign-owned investments represented less than 
 17
existed before the law was passed or were not implemented. In 1998, 22 ‘existing’ projects 
(almost one-third of those approved that year) benefited from the tax exemptions, with a total 
value of more than US$ 20 million.  
 
Almost two-thirds of the projects that were granted tax exemptions were classified as 
‘industrial’ while the rest were in the service sector, including tourism and health. However, 
many projects classified as ‘industrial’ were actually hotels and private medical services. 
Most of these were large projects where capital investment exceeded US$ 1 million. Due to 
fairly generous exemptions and tax holidays benefiting larger companies, some critics argued 
that the law was biased towards large firms, thus promoting monopolies and rents to 
politically influential groups. Moreover, it was argued that the ‘Investment Promotion Law’ 
ignored small-scale businesses that represented the majority of Palestinian enterprises. 
 
The PNA repeatedly called upon foreign investors, and in particular the Palestinian diaspora, 
to invest in Palestine. Responding to this call, one group of Palestinian investors established 
the Palestinian Development and Investment Corporation (PADICO). This company 
established a number of subsidiaries in various sectors, including telecommunications, real 
estate, industrial estate, tourism, electronics and poultry (see Nasr, 2004). Another group of 
investors founded the Arab Palestinian Investment Corporation (APIC), which set up 
subsidiaries within medical services, car rental, cold storage, shopping centres, etc. Both 
foreign and local investors invested in the banking sector, which expanded from two banks in 
1993 to 22 banks (with 120 branches) in 2000. Of these banks, 13 were wholly or partly 
owned by the diaspora (PEPRI/MAS, 1997). In addition, some smaller foreign investors 
invested in the real-estate and service sectors, which were perceived to be less risky than other 
sectors. Long-term investments in job-creating sectors, however, were limited due to the 
political instability. 
 
In contrast to local capital that was dominated by small-scale family capital, expatriate capital 
was represented by larger businesses. A number of large expatriate businesspeople were 
offered a ‘partnership’ with the PLO to develop Palestine economically. But according to 
Hilal and Khan (2004), Arafat was careful not to give political weight to expatriate capital. 
Instead, he viewed these partnerships as a way of enhancing the rent-seeking activities of the 
                                                                                     
5 per cent of the capital. Joint ventures between foreign and domestic investors contributed the remaining 38 per 
cent. 
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PNA: for instance, by providing discretionary funds and to some extent also as a tool for job 
creation. In return, the PNA granted expatriate capital selective monopoly status (see Nasr, 
2004) and tax exemptions. 
 
This is also supported by survey data. According to Sewell (2001), perceptions of the tax 
system and regulations differed between firms according to the size of the firm. Almost 65 per 
cent of the small firms (with fewer than 10 full-time employees) and 57 per cent of the 
medium-size firms (with 10-50 full-time employees) in the sample considered taxes and 
regulations to be major or moderate constraints to business. In contrast, less than 35 per cent 
of the larger firms gave this answer. With respect to taxation, 74 per cent of small firms, 61 
per cent of medium-size firms and only 26 per cent of large firms considered high taxes to be 
a moderate or major constraint to their businesses. Moreover, in contrast to smaller and 
medium-size firms, a majority of large firms (58 per cent) said that they or their trade 
associations were frequently, mostly or always consulted about changes in regulation or 
policies. 
 
The tax concessions given to larger investors reflect the substantial bargaining power of 
owners of mobile capital vis-à-vis the PNA, in contrast to the bargaining power of small-scale 
businesses whose major capital was in the form of fixed property. But, given the extreme 
political instability in the Palestinian territories and the fact that the PNA during this period 
was a ‘government’ that lacked many of the formal powers of a national government, these 
achievements of attracting large-scale investors were not trivial. It is here that the mutual co-
operation between the PNA and capitalists was highest. Thus, these activities indicate that the 
PNA managed to take a longer-term perspective on the development of Palestine. Yet, the 
PNA faced substantial institutional constraints in terms of both extracting more revenue from 
the business sector and widening its tax base.  
 
To some extent, small-scale agriculture also benefited from tax exemptions. Since most 
agricultural activities were located in either the B-designated areas where the PNA and Israel 
had joint responsibility for security, or in the C-designated areas where security was totally 
under Israeli control, both the PNA and foreign donors were reluctant to give aid to 
agricultural activities due to the uncertain political situation. The sector was partly 
compensated by various economic concessions, including tax exemptions. In the West Bank, 
but not in Gaza, all agricultural incomes were exempted from income tax. The differences 
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between the West Bank and Gaza in this respect are partly historical. Under the Jordanian tax 
codes that were in force in the WB during the period 1951-1967, and onwards until the 
establishment of the PNA, farmers and the agricultural sector were exempted from income 
taxes. In the GS, however, the tax codes were influenced by the historically Egyptian codes, 
which did not exempt farmers from taxation. The PNA showed no willingness to change these 
codes substantially, and used the pretext that agricultural income in the WB was more subject 
than elsewhere to weather fluctuations since it depended heavily on olive production. But the 
fact that farmers, peasants and village-dwellers in general played an important role in the 
national movement in the WB most likely also had impacts on the tax policy adopted towards 
these groups. 
 
 
Foreign aid 
To what extent did the inflow of foreign aid to Palestine provide a disincentive for the PNA in 
terms of its tax-collection efforts? During the period 1994-2000, the PNA had significant, 
although declining, ‘unearned’ incomes in the form of foreign aid (Table 3). In view of their 
active involvement in the Middle East peace process, we would expect that international aid 
organisations substantially influenced the shaping of the PNA’s economic policies – including 
tax policies.  
 
Annual disbursements to the PNA – in the form of loans and grants – averaged US$ 600 
million per year in the period 1994-99, corresponding to almost 14 per cent of Gross National 
Income (GNI) per annum over the six years (Table 3). Almost 90 per cent of the aid in this 
period was provided in the form of grants. Moreover, more than half of the aid was for current 
spending, including job creation and technical assistance, and the rest was devoted to 
investments projects (Fischer et al., 2001: 258). In 1999, foreign aid funded all Palestinian 
public investments, of about 5 per cent of GDP (including investments undertaken by the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 
Still, the ratio of fiscal revenue to GDP was about 23 per cent in 1999, compared to an aid-to-
GDP ratio of around 10 per cent. However, when the revenue collected by Israel through the 
clearing system is excluded, the ratio of ‘domestic’ fiscal revenue to GDP was approximately 
9 per cent. Foreign aid amounted to almost US$ 175 per capita, making the West Bank and 
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Gaza one of the largest recipients of aid in the world on a per capita basis.24 Donor support for 
current expenditures declined, however, over the period from 18 per cent of GDP in 1994 to 
around 10 per cent in 1999.  
 
Based on the available data, it is not possible to provide a clear answer to the question of 
whether the inflow of foreign aid impacted on domestic revenue generation – and if so, how. 
The scope for influencing the tax policy was limited, too. Firstly, the PNA inherited a fairly 
developed tax system, including VAT, because of the Israeli occupation in 1967. Secondly, 
after 1994, the tax system – especially in relation to indirect taxes – was to a large extent 
regulated by the principles of the Paris Protocol. But there can be no doubt that donor 
assistance had a substantial effect on the Palestinian domestic economy in the period from 
1994 to 2000. Most immediately, the inflow of foreign aid stimulated local economic activity 
and contributed to household incomes. Moreover, until the Israeli demolition of the 
administrative and physical infrastructure on the West Bank in April 2002, aid also enhanced 
the productive potential of the economy by supporting investments that expanded the 
underlying economic productive capacity.25   
 
The World Bank (2000: 26-27) estimated that the production capacity of the Palestinian 
economy was 6-7 per cent higher than it would have been without donor-financed 
investments. Thus, foreign aid contributed to offset parts of the cumulative negative effects of 
the Israeli policy of border closure and other restrictions against the Palestinian people. In 
particular, the initially high degree of budget support provided by donors helped the PNA to 
establish operations and avoid potentially destabilising fiscal deficits at a critical stage. 
However, recurrent budget support also facilitated an expansion of public sector employment 
that led to overstaffing and probably undermined the administrative efficiency of the PNA.  
 
On several occasions, donors criticised the PNA for lack of transparency in its financial 
operations, including its off-budget fiscal activities and weak technical decisions in its 
handling of public finances. But their focus was on keeping the peace process alive. Hence, 
foreign donors’ seemed to a large extent to turn a blind eye to issues such as transparency and 
                            
24 In comparison, non-military foreign assistance to Israel represented approximately US$ 247 per capita (DAC, 
1997). 
25 After a series of suicide bombings, the Israeli army invaded and re-occupied Palestinian population centres on 
the West Bank. The military occupation lasted for over three weeks (29 March to 21 April 2002). For detailed 
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accountability in the PNA’s fiscal affairs. Given the political instability and the contagious 
effects of escalating violence in the area, this position may seem to have been justified. 
However, by making the PNA relatively dependent on external political and material support, 
and relatively independent of its own citizens, the approach taken by donors, if it had been 
continued, might have contributed over time to undermining the development of fiscal 
rectitude and accountability in the PNA.  
 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
While acknowledging the obvious weaknesses of an essentially exploratory study we have 
argued in this article that over the period 1994-2000 the PNA faced three main constraints to 
enhancing tax revenue. First, and not very surprisingly, the quality of the tax administration 
system was crucial. Institutional capacity was weak and had to be built up from scratch. 
Within a fairly short period of time, the PNA managed to establish relatively well-functioning 
central government tax agencies. But despite the progress made in improving the tax 
administration substantial weaknesses remained. Most important was the erosion of the tax 
base due to generous tax exemptions. Moreover, some administrative procedures facilitated 
tax evasion and corruption. Second, and more important than any other factor, Israel 
represented a constraint on the PNA’s tax policies and revenue collection. The dependency on 
Israel through the revenue clearance system left the PNA extremely vulnerable and gave 
Israel a political weapon to exert pressure on the PNA. On several occasions Israel withheld 
tax revenue collected, in violation of the Paris Protocol. Third, various interest groups – in 
particular foreign-based capital owners, and to some extent professionals – constrained the 
PNA’s revenue mobilisation efforts. The tax exemptions given to larger investors reflect the 
substantial bargaining power of owners of mobile capital vis-à-vis the PNA. But they were 
also consistent with the PNA’s economic policy, emphasising investment incentives to large 
corporate interests in order to further rapid economic growth. It is uncertain, however, 
whether the dependency on foreign assistance both for investments and to cover running 
expenses had direct impacts on the regime’s tax policies and incentives to raise domestic 
revenue.  
                                                                                     
accounts of the damage caused by the IDF during the re-occupation, see the press release of the ‘Local aid co-
ordination committee co-chairs’ [LACC] (15 May 2002); and PNEIJ (2002). 
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To conclude, within its restricted room of manoeuvre, the PNA managed to raise significant 
domestic revenues subject to the constraint of consolidating and maintaining its power. It also 
used the tax system as a means of enhancing rents from industries and sectors that the 
leadership believed were important for economic development, and to grant generous tax 
exemptions to politically important stakeholders such as professionals. In contrast, few tax 
concessions were given to employees in the formal sector. The business interests of the 
minority of expatriate capitalists were more influential than trade unions and the emerging 
domestically based business associations. At the same time, the PNA also made real progress, 
with generous external assistance, in establishing a functioning economic administration and 
in developing the physical and institutional infrastructure of the economy. This secured 
widespread internal legitimacy among the Palestinian population, which was also reflected in 
the 1996 election and helped the PNA to centralise power.  
 
The al-Aqsa intifada marks the end of the first phase of state formation in Palestine. Revenue 
in the form of general taxes and income tax from monopolies dried up with the escalation of 
the conflict. From October 2000, Israel stopped transferring revenue collected on behalf of the 
PNA and the central state organs in Palestine became strapped for cash. This led to long 
delays in the payment of salaries to ministerial staff, and the maintenance of infrastructure 
also came to a standstill. Foreign aid did not manage to compensate for this revenue shortfall. 
Increasingly, aid bypassed the central government and went directly to local institutions and 
non-governmental and religious organisations. This was particularly the case with aid and 
financial support originating from other Arab nations. This situation, coupled with escalating 
poverty and unemployment, and growing frustration among Palestinians about lack of 
progress in the relationship with Israel, led to increasing support for opposition parties and the 
Islamists. But although the events since autumn 2000 have put further progress on hold, the 
experiences over the period 1994-2000 is likely to provide important lessons about the 
constraints that a future Palestinian state will face with respect to revenue mobilisation.  
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TABLES 
 
 
Table 1 Composition of major fiscal revenues in Palestine, 1995-2000 (as % of total fiscal 
revenues) 
 
Revenue sources 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Income taxes  11.6 8.3 8.6 9.0 8.2 8.3 
Indirect taxes on domestic 
goods and services  
66.0 61.2 54.6 51.0 47.7 n.a. 
Indirect taxes on international 
transactions 
6.2 16.0 20.0 26.7 30.3 n.a. 
Property taxes 0.16 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.15 n.a. 
Non-tax revenues (fees and 
charges) 
15.8 14.3 16.7 13.3 13.6 n.a. 
    
   Sources: Palestinian National Authority (2000) and World Bank (2001). 
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Table 2 Palestinian fiscal revenues collected by Israel through the clearance system, 1995-
1999 (in % of total revenues from the specific revenue base) 
 
Revenue sources 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Income taxes  10.1 7.2 9.1 13.5 8.4 
Indirect taxes on domestic 
goods and services  
80.2 75.6 72.8 70.2 70.8 
Indirect taxes on international 
transactions 
72.1 79.1 86.7 89.5 87.9 
Non-tax revenues (fees and 
charges) 
25.4 12.4 14.3 15.6 15.2 
    
    Sources: Palestinian National Authority (2000) and World Bank (2001). 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 The PNA’s revenues cleared by Israel and foreign aid, 1994-1999 (million USD, the figures 
in brackets are in percentage of GNI) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1994-9 
Revenue cleared by 
Israel 
25 
(0.06) 
266 
(6.4) 
420 
(10.3) 
496 
(11.1) 
542 
(11.4) 
626 
(12.2) 
2,375 
(9.0) 
Total foreign aid 
disbursements 
612 
(15.4) 
547 
(13.2) 
647 
(15.8) 
654 
(14.7) 
553 
(11.6) 
609 
(11.9) 
3,622 
(13.8) 
 
  Sources: Fischer et al., (2001:256, Table 1) and Arnon and Weinblatt (2001:299, Table 4). 
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